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1. Introduction 
In order to use a theoretical framework to interpret real phenomena, two questions need to 
be made absolutely clear: (1) What is the phenomenon that the framework is intended to 
investigate? In other words: what question is the framework intended to answer? (2) What 
is the correspondence between theoretical and empirical magnitudes? 
 Piketty (2014) employs the usual, neoclassical, growth-theoretical tools in an 
attempt to explain actual long-run inequality dynamics, from the end of the nineteenth 
century to the present. However, the attempt is flawed from the very beginning, owing to 
the fact that the model he has in mind --- whether we like it or not --- is based on theoretical 
magnitudes whose empirical counterparts are definitely not those that Piketty actually takes 
from the System of National Accounts (SNA, hereinafter) (UN, 2009). 
 In turn, Taylor (2014) criticizes Piketty’s ‘narrative’ on the basis of the underlying 
theoretical framework (bypassing the above-mentioned ‘theory-empirics’ inconsistency). 
He then attempts to extend Pasinetti’s (1962) framework, which in his opinion provides a 
“macroeconomic narrative as unsatisfactory as Piketty’s” (Taylor 2014: 12), since the 
framework assumes full employment, on the one hand, and a rate of profit that 
automatically adjusts to guarantee the maintenance of full employment, on the other. In so 
doing, Taylor attributes to Pasinetti’s framework an objective that is not the one originally 
envisioned by Pasinetti. In other words, Taylor criticizes the framework based on the fact 
that it is not suited to answer a question which is not the one it was intended to answer. 
 We can substantiate each of these claims and a series of related issues in turn. 
2. Equilibrium Conditions versus Accounting Identities 
The search for equilibrium conditions of steady growth has been a task of economic theory 
for a long time. The aim is a normative one: which properties should a system on a steady 
growth path possess? Or, to put it differently, what is required, from a purely hypothetical 
point of view and given the initial conditions of an economic system, to keep it along such 
a path? 
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 Some economists do not agree with this approach, stating that economics, as a 
social science, should aim at providing explanations of actual tendencies rather than 
describing an ideal system. What may perhaps be considered pernicious, however, is 
attributing to an actual system the properties of an ideal one. Or, more specifically, stating 
equilibrium conditions --- or ad-hoc definitions --- as if these were accounting identities. 
This is done both by Piketty and Taylor. 
 Consider first the case of Piketty’s ‘First fundamental Law of Capitalism’ (Piketty 
2014: 52): 𝛼 = 𝑟𝛽. He presents it as an accounting identity, but it actually is an ad-hoc 
definition, following from his very peculiar notion of ‘capital’. This operational definition 
is then used (Piketty and Zucman 2014b:  45) to compute an implied economy-wide ‘rate of 
return’	𝑟 = 𝛼/𝛽, implicitly relying on the “institutional principle that profits are distributed 
in proportion to the ownership of capital” (Pasinetti 1974: 110), even though Piketty’s 
capital-income share (𝛼) and wealth-to-income ratio (𝛽) do not conform to the notion of 
profits and capital stock that underlie this institutional principle. 
 Moreover, Piketty (2014: 166) presents his ‘Second Fundamental Law of 
Capitalism’,	𝛽 = 𝑠/𝑔, as asymptotically valid in the long run; in other words, as an 
equilibrium (steady state) condition: it is the condition for 𝛽 to be constant over time. 
Conversely, Taylor inaccurately pretends that it is an accounting identity. When showing 
this, Taylor states that the rate of growth of real output “will be close to the growth rate of 
capital stock” (Taylor 2014: 5); this is true only along a steady growth path, when 𝐼/𝐾 =𝑔+, and hence such an assumption implies that the relation derived is an equilibrium 
condition, not an accounting identity from the SNA. 
3. Theoretical versus Empirical Categories 
Before proceeding to Taylor’s (2014) interpretation of Pasinetti’s (1962) framework, it is 
worth devoting a few lines to Piketty’s use of data coming from the SNA. Again, 
computing synthetic measures that combine different aggregates (and especially stocks and 
flows) requires having a clear idea of which is the question to be addressed. 
 As regards stocks, Piketty provides an astonishing definition of ‘capital’ or ‘wealth’ 
(used interchangeably):2 private wealth is the financial net worth plus the value of non-
financial assets of the institutional sector ‘Households and Non-Profit Institutions serving 
Households’;3 while market value national wealth is the sum of private wealth and the net 
worth plus value of real assets of the institutional sector ‘General Government’. According 
to Piketty, the capital stock of corporations is completely included in the market value of 
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equities and corporate bonds possessed by Households.4 As concerns flows, ‘income’ is 
measured by Net National Income (NNI), i.e. GNI net of consumption of fixed capital.5 
 Clearly, computing a capital-output ratio based on such definitions, to answer 
questions of growth theory, is completely inadequate, for a series of reasons: (1) while the 
concept of income includes all institutional sectors, that of wealth excludes corporations;6 
(2) NNI is a different concept than output, since it is given by the net product plus net 
transfers to the rest of the world; (3) most importantly, the concept of the capital-output 
ratio aims at looking at the relation between the value of output and the value of the stock 
of capital which is currently installed as productive capacity. Piketty’s notion of capital, by 
excluding corporations, and thus the value of their real assets (which contains the item 
Fixed Assets, i.e. the stock of accumulated, productive capacity), prevents us from 
interpreting 𝛽 as a measure of capital intensity. 
 The very fact that Piketty’s measure of wealth only includes that part of the stock of 
fixed capital which is held by Households (an institutional sector which contains 
unincorporated business)7 has an additional implication. The proportion of fixed assets held 
by Households to the total greatly varies from country to country and through time. Hence, 
using such a measure for international comparisons is misleading. 
 Then, one could think of attaching a completely different meaning --- i.e. outside 
the realm of growth theory --- to Piketty’s ‘wealth-to-income’ ratio: how large is the value 
of the stock of private or national wealth in comparison to the flow of national income? 
Though approximately correct for the case of private income, for national wealth the ratio 
is inadequate to answer such a question. In fact, the institutional subsector ‘Financial 
corporations’ of the SNA also includes the Central Bank. Hence, by using Piketty’s 
definition of wealth, one would be considering all public bonds held by the Central Bank--- 
and by all other corporations --- as a liability for the country as a whole, while the value of 
those held by Households would correctly cancel out with the corresponding liability of the 
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general government. This is not an innocent outcome, since it implies, consciously or not, 
that a central bank absorbing public bonds is, by definition, a net loss for the wealth of the 
country as a whole. 
4. Kaldor-Pasinetti Theory of Income Distribution and Class Struggle 
In line with what was stated in the Introduction, the first issue to clarify is the question 
which Pasinetti (1962) intended to answer. For given rates of growth of population and 
productivity,8 it is possible to determine the amount of investment that would be necessary 
to undertake in order to maintain a situation of full employment. But given the propensities 
to save of laborers and capitalists, is it possible --- and under which conditions --- to 
determine a profit share, and hence a rate of profit, able to ensure the amount of profits 
necessary for such an investment level to be met? 
 This aim --- that of looking for equilibrium conditions --- is explicitly stated by 
Pasinetti himself: 
 “A second and separate problem concerns the interpretative value of the model. When Mr 
Kaldor presented his theory of income distribution, he pointed out that the interpretative value of 
the theory depends on the Keynesian hypotheses on which it is built. [...] But this is not the 
approach that I should like to take here. Whether we are or whether we are not prepared to accept 
the model in this behavioural sense, there are important practical implications which are valid in 
any case. I should look, therefore, at the previous analysis simply and more generally as a logical 
framework to answer interesting questions about what ought to happen if full employment is to be 
kept over time, more than as a behavioural theory expressing what actually happens.” 
 Pasinetti (1974: 118-9, emphasis added) 
 On the contrary, Taylor interprets Pasinetti’s scheme as a descriptive one:9 
 “In his original model, Pasinetti operated in a rather different world, assuming full 
employment (determining 𝑢 [the output/capital ratio]) and in line with Piketty a given growth rate 
[of investment demand] 𝐾-𝑠. He then argued that 𝜋 [the profit share] would adjust so that (4) [the 
equation describing the capital stock growth rate permitted by available savings] could be satisfied. 
If 𝐾-𝑠 were to go up there would have to be a wage squeeze to generate ‘forced saving’ to meet 
higher investment demand.” 
 (Taylor 2014: 12) 
 Moreover, Taylor states that the analysis of the dynamics of wealth concentration is 
the key contribution of Pasinetti’s article (Taylor 2014: 12). Quite the opposite, Pasinetti’s 
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conclusions are that (1) the equilibrium distribution between profits and wages depends 
neither on workers’ propensity to save nor on the stock of capital --- and on the relative 
magnitude of 𝐾/ and 𝐾0; (2) the equilibrium distribution of income between workers and 
capitalists does not depend on 𝐾0 and 𝐾/, but only on 𝐼/𝐾 and 𝑋/𝐾 --- and on both 𝑠/ and 𝑠0. In other words, the 𝑍 = 𝐾//𝐾 ratio plays basically no role in Pasinetti’s treatment of 
income distribution.10 
 The issue is slightly more subtle than what the formulae reveal. In fact, keeping in 
mind the aim of Pasinetti’s article --- looking for equilibrium conditions for physical 
reproduction, in the spirit of Marx’s reproduction schemes --- it should be clear that 
nothing is done in order to describe the actual mechanisms of a working capitalist economy. 
On the contrary, explicit reference is made to the possibility of applying the same 
framework to both a capitalist and a socialist system. 
 As soon as capitalism is introduced into the picture, it is hard to consider the 
distribution of the capital stock between workers and capitalists emerging from Pasinetti 
(1962) as a description --- even in terms of equilibrium conditions --- of the actual 
dynamics of wealth concentration. Indeed, even if workers do actually lend money to 
capitalists in order for them to invest, this implies a flow of property income accruing to 
workers in the form of interest payments, but not the accumulation of a portion of the 
capital stock: the means of production that identify capital as a social relation are entirely 
possessed by the capitalists.11 
 In fact, within this context, individual workers are not entitled to claim property 
rights that give them true command over capital, nor to undertake investment --- but only 
saving --- decisions. Income can be hoarded, not only invested, so that if workers had a 
saving propensity greater than that required by actual investment decisions by capitalists, 
this would not imply any form of ‘euthanasia of the rentier’. 
5. Steady States for the Control-Ratio Z and Simultaneous Determination 
of Prices and Quantities 
Taylor’s (2014) way of elaborating on Pasinetti (1962) in order to determine the steady-
state dynamics of the Z ratio comes directly from the work of Samuelson and Modigliani 
(1966), who deemed Pasinetti’s result as ‘paradoxical’ --- though having to admit its 
correctness --- and looked for an escape route. In Pasinetti’s words: 
                                               
10 The ratio 𝐾0/𝐾 is computed just as an intermediate step in order to obtain a definite expression for 𝑃/𝐾 
(Pasinetti 1962: 271). 
11 In Pasinetti (1962), 𝐾0 may be interpreted as the stock of capital accumulated owing to workers’ savings, 
rather than the stock of capital possessed by workers. 
 “If the capitalists were not to exist any more, their propensity to save obviously could not 
determine the rate of profit. There is, therefore, a way of preventing the Cambridge equation from 
operating, and that is by eliminating the capitalists from the system!” 
  (Pasinetti 1974: 130) 
 The paper by Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) gave rise to further research on the 
dynamics of Z according to different hypotheses, e.g. as regards the ‘aggregate investment’ 
function (e.g. Darity, 1981). 
 Taylor (2014) further elaborates on this framework in relation to Piketty’s analysis 
of the secular development of inequality. He emphasizes that Piketty uses marginal 
equalities involving an aggregate production function to determine jointly the profit share 
and the capital intensity by means of an adjusting capital/labor ratio, with full employment 
of the labor force. But full employment is almost never observed in real data. 
 Hence, a more realistic model is required “in which output, economic growth, 
employment and income are determined along Keynesian lines by effective demand” 
(Taylor 2014: 6). Taylor thus advances a framework where (𝑢, 𝑟, 𝐾-) are determined by (𝜋, 𝑍) (Taylor 2014: 12), noticing, however, that in Pasinetti (1962) (𝜋, 𝑟, 𝑍) are 
determined by (𝑔+, 𝑢). Hence, looking at the logic underlying Taylor’s model, especially in 
relation to Pasinetti (1962), some issues do emerge. 
 First of all, it is worth stressing that whereas Taylor eventually writes both the 
saving supply and investment demand as functions of the profit share 𝜋, these were 
originally specified as functions of the rate of profit 𝑟. If this original specification is kept, 𝑢 emerges from saving-investment market-clearing as a linear function of 𝑟, increasing 
when (𝑠/ − 𝑠0)𝑟𝐾/ < 𝛼𝑟𝐾.12 In his analysis, Taylor assumes such a positive relation 
between 𝑢 and 𝑟, i.e. a long-run profit-led growth regime. With this constraint, the 
dynamics of ‘capital concentration’ is determined by ?̇? = [(𝑠/ − 𝛼)𝑟 − 𝑔;]𝑍, which can be 
zero (1) when 𝑍 = 0 (which corresponds to the Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) setting) 
or (2) when 𝑟 = 𝑔;/(𝑠/ − 𝛼), independently of 𝑍. 
 Second, there seems to be a crucial difference between the idea and role of 
capital/output ratio that Piketty, Taylor and Pasinetti have in mind. In fact, such ratio can be 
written as 𝛽 = 𝐾/𝑋 = (𝐾/𝑋∗)/(𝑋/𝑋∗), i.e. as the ratio between the full employment 
capital/output ratio 𝜅 = 𝐾/𝑋∗ and the output gap 𝑋/𝑋∗. Piketty has in mind a situation in 
which output is at its potential and hence 𝑋/𝑋∗ = 1, while 𝜅 adjusts according to the usual 
marginalist mechanisms. Pasinetti also considers a situation in which 𝑋/𝑋∗ = 1, but in his 
case the stock of capital 𝐾 is determined by the technique in use, and hence 𝜅 can change 
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only due to technical progress, and not as an adjustment variable in the determination of 
income distribution. Finally, Taylor defines 𝑢 as the output/capital ratio, but considers it as 
an “activity level” indicator (Taylor 2014: 10); referring explicitly to Barbosa-Filho and 
Taylor (2006) and Kiefer and Rada (2013) where 𝑢 = 𝑋/𝑋∗. In essence, Taylor (2014) may 
be implicitly considering 𝜅 as fixed, so that saving-investment market-clearing in a ‘profit-
led’ regime on the one side, and a symmetric profit-squeeze mechanism --- the more output 
falls short of potential, the higher the profit share --- on the other, simultaneously determine 
both 𝑋 and 𝑟 (because 𝑋∗ is taken as given). 
 This reveals the deep conceptual difference between the analyses of Taylor (2014) 
and Pasinetti (1962). In the latter, income distribution --- that is, the weights with which 𝑠/ 
and 𝑠0 enter into overall saving propensity --- makes aggregate saving to equalize 
equilibrium investments, themselves determined by the technique in use and the evolution 
of final demand for consumption.13 The overall saving propensity is the variable which 
adjusts to guarantee an amount of savings equal to the exogenously given equilibrium 
investment level. Hence, at a normative level, the maintenance of natural growth logically 
implies a certain distribution between wages and profits. 
 In Taylor’s framework, on the contrary, 𝑢 and 𝑟 --- that is, activity level and 
distribution --- are simultaneously determined through ‘price-quantity’ interactions that 
clear the market for ‘capital’ and trigger a profit-squeeze mechanism. The nature of these 
‘price-quantity’ interactions, inspired by Goodwin’s (1967) prey-predator scheme of ‘class 
struggle’, was originally intended to depict “a starkly schematized and hence quite 
unrealistic model of cycles in growth rates” (Goodwin 1967: 54, emphasis added).14 
 This notwithstanding, Taylor (2014) intends to explain long-run development. In 
other words, Taylor develops an analytical scheme which aims at coping with long-run 
tendencies, but embodying mechanisms at work in the explanation of medium-run cycles. 
Stacking both layers by using medium-run mechanisms to characterize long-run steady 
states (e.g. as regards assumptions on the sign of the derivatives that define stability), may 
not be as straightforward as it seems. 
 In fact, when dealing with the difficulties entailed in providing a unified framework 
to characterize both cycles and growth, Pasinetti observed: 
 “[O]n the one hand, the macro-economic models which provide a cyclical interpretation of 
economic activity cannot give any explanation of economic growth, and, on the other hand, those 
theories which define, or rely on, the conditions for a dynamic equilibrium to be reached and 
maintained cannot give an explanation of business cycles.” 
                                               
13 In the context of Pasinetti (1962), which deals with uniform steady growth, the evolution of final demand 
for consumption is determined by population growth. 
14 Note, moreover, that Goodwin (1967: 54) assumed a fixed and constant technically feasible capital-output 
ratio 𝜅. 
 (Pasinetti 1974: Chapter III, 69) 
 In a few words, Pasinetti envisaged the following problem: 
 “the excessive degree of confidence [...] in the investment function, the parameters of which 
are responsible for a radically different behaviour of the system according to the range of values 
they fall in. This is surprising because no economist would be prepared to rely very much on the 
stability over time of these parameters” 
 (Pasinetti 1974: Chapter III, 71) 
 In fact, in Taylor’s scheme the dynamics of the system entirely depends on the 
functional form chosen for the investment function. 
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